By the Book:Enrichment by Interference by Steven, Andrew
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the Book
Citation for published version:
Steven, A 2007, 'By the Book: Enrichment by Interference' Edinburgh Law Review, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 411-
15. DOI: 10.3366/elr.2007.11.3.411
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3366/elr.2007.11.3.411
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Edinburgh Law Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
©Steven, A. (2007). By the Book: Enrichment by Interference. Edinburgh Law Review, 11, 411-15doi:
10.3366/elr.2007.11.3.411
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
411analysisVol 11 2007
EdinLR Vol 11 pp 411-415
similar dilemmas as a result of different forms of personal injury. It is, therefore, to 
be welcomed that at the same time as proposing this legislation, the Scottish Minis-
ters referred the general question of damages for wrongful death to the Scottish Law 
Commission, thus providing an opportunity for the law in this area to be rationalised.
James Chalmers
University of Edinburgh
The author wishes to acknowledge the comments of Dr Fiona Leverick on an earlier 
draft, and the support of Queen Mary, University of London, where he was based as a 
visiting research fellow at the time when this note was written.
By the Book: Enrichment by Interference
HarperCollins Publishers Ltd v Young1 is an example of a rarity: a case on corporeal 
moveables in the Court of Session.2 The pursuer, the well-known publisher, operates 
a distribution centre in Glasgow. There it receives books returned from retailers. It 
pulps the paperbacks, but outsources the pulping of hardbacks and audio books to 
another company, Stirling Fibre Ltd. The pursuer averred that various of its products, 
which were wrapped in cellophane, had “gone missing”3 from the centre or in transit 
to that company. It further averred that the defender, during a fi ve-year period, had 
listed for sale 14,083 products published by the pursuer on the internet site ebay and 
had sold 9,365. The defender was said to have made £61,351.57 from these sales. The 
pursuer averred that it had no commercial relationship with the defender and that the 
books that he marketed were those items which had gone missing. It sought a whole 
battery of remedies, including redelivery of the books and payment of the profi t made 
by selling them. The case came before Lady Clark of Calton in the Outer House for 
a debate.
A. PROVING OWNERSHIP
The pursuer faced an uphill battle as to proving the books were its property. It averred 
that due to the scale of its operation at the distribution centre it was “not possible … 
to ascertain exactly when or how the items went missing”.4 About 120 million books 
were distributed from there every year. The defender argued that there was no proper 
link between the books which had allegedly disappeared and those sold or held by the 
defender. The pursuer contended, however, that the low prices at which the defender 
marketed the goods made it impossible for him to have obtained them legitimately. 
1 [2007] CSOH 65.
2 For another example, see Boskabelle Ltd v Laird [2006] CSOH 173, 2006 SLT 1079, discussed in D L 
Carey Miller, “Right to annual crops” (2007) 11 EdinLR 274.
3 [2007] CSOH 65 at para 4.
4 Para 7.
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Also signifi cant was the defender’s description of the goods as “new” or “brand new” 
and the fact that they were in the manufacturer’s cellophane wrapping.
Lady Clark was willing to accept the pursuer’s argument: “I consider that, in theory 
at least, the pursuer is entitled to set out averments seeking to establish a controlled 
and limited market from which an inference might be drawn that the products of the 
pursuer sold by the defender and held by the defender were not sourced from any 
legitimate market and were products stolen as averred by the pursuer. I consider that 
is a matter which can only be resolved by proof”.5 It seems to the present writer that 
when it comes to that proof, the pursuer will have the diffi cult task of rebutting the 
presumption that the possessor is owner.6 The defender will not need to establish 
that possession was acquired in good faith.7 It is questionable the extent to which the 
presumption can be rebutted by an inference. There is authority, however, that in an 
action for delivery it is suffi cient to prove previous possession coupled with its loss in 
circumstances where there was not an intention to give up title, for example wrongful 
taking.8 It is not clear whether the inference mentioned by Lady Clark would be suffi -
cient in this regard, but one can have sympathy with the pursuer’s predicament given 
the scale of its operation.
B. ENRICHMENT BY INTERFERENCE
The pursuer also sought to show that the defender was in bad faith. To the uninitiated 
reader of the decision, the reason for this is unclear. It concerns an area of law which 
is nowhere to be found in the discussion of bad faith: unjustifi ed enrichment.9 The 
law draws a distinction between cases where (a) a party has sold another’s goods in the 
knowledge of the true position and (b) where such a sale is made in good faith. In the 
words of Sheriff Principal Robert Reid QC: 10  
There is inherent in the legal idea of ownership, a right on the part of the owner to demand 
his property from any person into whose hands it may come or to recover the value of the 
property from any possessor who has sold it knowing that he had not acquired a good title 
to it from his author. If the possessor has parted with the property in ignorance of a defect 
in the title of his author and without negligence he is liable to the owner quantum lucratus 
in recompense.       
In relation to showing bad faith on the part of the defender, the pursuer once again 
faced a heavy challenge. Lady Clark commented that the case was unusual, because 
the pursuer was “not in a position to aver and prove theft of the pursuer’s goods, except 
by inference.”11 The pursuer sought to rely on the defender’s description of the goods 
5 Para 10.
6 Stair, Inst 2.1.42.
7 Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police v Sharp 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 95, discussed in D L Carey Miller, “Title 
to moveables: Mr Sharp’s Porsche” (2003) 7 EdinLR 221.  
8 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 531.
9 Strictly, however, in cases where property is handed away in bad faith and liability is for full value rather 
than quantum lucratus, it may be argued that the claim is for compensation and not enrichment.
10 Merchandise Funds Co Ltd v Maxwell 1978 SLT (Sh Ct) 18 at 19.
11 [2007] CSOH 65 at para 10.
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as “new” or “brand new” as evidence of his bad faith. Lady Clark was not persuaded, 
suggesting that there required to be an advertising statement that the products had 
come direct from the pursuer, plus averments that the defender knew or should have 
known that he had no contract with the pursuer to distribute. She concluded that no 
relevant case of bad faith had been pled.
This left the pursuer with an enrichment claim based on profi t made upon the sales, 
i.e. recovery on the basis of quantum lucratus. It has to be said that the texts relied on 
by the parties are peculiar. There is much institutional authority here. For example, 
Stair writes: 12 
the obligation of restitution is formally founded upon the having of things of others in our 
power, and therefore, that ceasing, the obligation also ceaseth. As he who bona fi de did buy 
that which did belong to another, if while he hath it, it appeareth to be that other’s, he must 
restore it . . . but if bona fi de he has sold it before he be questioned, he is free, and not obliged 
to restore it; though insofar as he is profi ted in receiving more for it than he gave, he be liable 
by the obligation of remuneration or recompense.
Other institutional writers treat the subject too.13 They are not cited. Neither is 
the modern academic work which categorises A’s profi t on a sale in good faith of 
B’s property as enrichment by interference.14 Instead, reliance is placed mainly on 
Walker on Delict15 and the fourth edition of Gloag and Henderson (1946),16 as well as 
relevant case law. 
The point at issue between the parties was whether the profi t on sale can be sought 
only if the property itself cannot be recovered. For if Alan sells Barbara’s property to 
Carol and Barbara gets back the property from Carol as well as the profi t made by 
Alan, there is “double recovery”. Reference was made to Carey Miller and Irvine’s 
treatment of this subject in the context of a sale by a bad faith possessor.17 The position 
stated in the fourth edition of Gloag and Henderson is:18
when a bona fi de purchaser of stolen products has resold them before receiving notice of the 
defect in his title, he is liable only for any profi t he may have made on the resale, and then 
12 Stair, Inst 1.7.11.
13 Erskine, Inst 3.1.10; Bell, Prin § 527; Hume, Lectures III, 234.
14 N R Whitty, “Some trends and issues in Scots enrichment law” 1994 JR 127 at 131; K G C Reid, “Unjus-
tifi ed enrichment and property law” 1994 JR 167 at 193; A J M Steven, “Recompense for inteference 
in Scots Law” 1996 JR 51 at 57-58; J Blackie, “Enrichment, wrongs and invasion of rights in Scots law” 
1997 Acta Juridica 284 at 286-288; N R Whitty, “Rationality, nationality and the taxonomy of enrich-
ment”, in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustifi ed Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative 
Perspective (2002) 658 at 705-708; J Blackie and I Farlam, “Enrichment by act of the party enriched”, 
in R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Prop-
erty and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 469 at 495-496; H L MacQueen, Unjustifi ed 
Enrichment (2004) 43-44; M Hogg, Obligations, 2nd edn (2006) paras 4-72-4.79.
15 D M Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn (1981) 1006.
16 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, 4th edn, by A D Gibb and N M 
L Walker (1946) 125.
17 D Carey Miller with D Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) 239-243, referring to 
Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum on Corporeal Moveables: Remedies (Scot Law 
Com CM No 31, 1976).
18 See n 16.
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only in the event of the products being irrecoverable. 
This edition was cited by the defender because it was relied on by the sheriff in Bunten 
v Silverdale,19 decided a few years later. The pursuer noted that the passage did not 
survive in later editions. As a matter of interest, it appeared in the fi rst edition (1927)20 
and was still there in the ninth edition (1987).21 But the tenth edition (1995)22 saw its 
removal and replacement with a passage which also appears in the current edition 
(2001)23 and which was cited by Lady Clark.24 This passage does not require the goods 
to be irrecoverable for there to be a claim.
Lady Clark also considered the case law in addition to Bunten, in particular Scot 
v Low,25 Faulds v Townsend26 and Jarvis v Manson.27 She concluded on the basis of 
these cases that a claim for unjustifi ed enrichment based on quantum lucratus was not 
limited to the situation where it was impossible to obtain restoration of the property. 
While the defender had submitted that the policy outcome of such a conclusion was 
unwelcome, she was bound by settled law. She was also not convinced that the remedy 
which the defender had said should be used was “so obviously desirable”. It would 
require the pursuer “to seek the return of hundreds of individual products from 
individuals in different parts of the world at a time when the products were unlikely 
to be in “new condition”.28 One can agree, but the possibility of double recovery is 
hardly desirable either.
Earlier, Lady Clark had expressed surprise that the policy issues had not been 
discussed more since the Scottish Law Commission looked at the subject in 1976.29 
The point is well taken though, in fact, they have been cogently examined by Professor 
19 (1951) 67 Sh Ct Rep 62. 
20 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland (1927) 115.
21 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, 9th edn, by A B Wilkinson and W 
A Wilson (1987) para 14.2.
22 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 10th edn, by W A Wilson and A D M Forte (1995). 
This was the edition in which the chapter entitled “Quasi Contract” was replaced by one entitled “Unjus-
tifi ed Enrichment”. See also H L MacQueen, “Peter Birks and Scots enrichment law”, in A Burrows 
and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (2006) 401 at 
401-402 and 416.
23 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 11th edn, by L J Dunlop et al (2001), para 28.11. 
In the 10th edn, it appears in para 29.11.  
24 [2007] CSOH 65 at para 15.
25 (1704) Mor 9123.
26 (1861) 23 D 437.
27 1954 SLT (Sh Ct) 93. A modern case on the area not cited was North-West Securities Ltd v Barrhead 
Coachworks Ltd 1976 SC 68.
28 [2007] CSOH 65 at para 17.
29 She refers to Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum on Corporeal Moveables – Passing 
of Risk and of Ownership (Scot Law Com CM No 25, 1976); Scottish Law Commission, Consultative 
Memorandum on Corporeal Moveables – Protection of the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer of Another’s 
Property (Scot Law Com CM No 27, 1976); and to Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memoran-
dum on Corporeal Moveables – Remedies (Scot Law Com CM No 31, 1976). These were part of a wider 
project by the Commission led by Sir Thomas Smith. Most of it remains unimplemented: see K G C 
Reid, “While one hundred remain: T B Smith and the progress of Scots law”, in E Reid and D L Carey 
Miller (eds), A Mixed Legal System in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of Scots Law (2005) 1 at 
4-5. 
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Eric Clive in his Draft Rules on Unjustifi ed Enrichment.30 He proposes two new rules. 
First, a person claiming redress of any unjustifi ed enrichment resulting from an inter-
ference with that person’s patrimonial rights is to be treated for the purpose of any 
claims by or against third parties as having ratifi ed that interference.31 Thus if Alan 
sells Barbara’s property to Carol and Barbara claims the profi t made by Alan, she is 
regarded as having ratifi ed the sale. This means that she cannot seek restitution of the 
property from Carol. Barbara thus has a choice: pursue Alan or pursue Carol. Double 
recovery is not possible. In the circumstances of the HarperCollins case, pursuit of the 
profi t is obviously the more attractive choice.
Professor Clive’s second rule32 limits that choice to protect purchasers in good faith. 
Under current law, if Alan sells Barbara’s property to Carol, who is in good faith, who 
then sells on to Derek, Barbara can recover any profi t which Carol makes.33 Professor 
Clive would remove this liability. He comments that “the prospect of ten or twelve 
intermediate purchasers who all acted in good faith being pursued for small profi ts 
by the owner of the goods (who might well recover the goods at a later date) is not 
appealing.”34 He further points out that the current law is inconsistent with the law on 
indirect enrichment in general and that in English law third party purchasers in good 
faith have a defence to a restitution claim. The defender in the HarperCollins case 
would not be advantaged by this rule unless he could have shown that he was a good 
faith purchaser. There is much to be said for Professor Clive’s proposed rules here35 
and hopefully they will be carefully considered if Parliament eventually legislates in 
this area.
Andrew J M Steven
University of Edinburgh 
The author would like to thank Professor Niall Whitty for his comments on an earlier 
draft.
30 E M Clive, Draft Rules on Unjustifi ed Enrichment, published as a separate appendix to Scottish Law 
Commission, Discussion Paper on Judicial Abolition of the Error of Law Rule and its Aftermath (Scot 
Law Com DP No 99, 1996) rules 3(3), (4).
31 Rule 3(3). This is similar to one of the suggestions made in Scottish Law Commission, Consultative 
Memorandum on Corporeal Moveables – Remedies (n 29) para 10. Compare § 816 BGB, discussed in 
B S Markesinis, W Lorenz and G Dannemann, The German Law of Obligations vol 1 (1997) 748-749.
32 Rule 3(4).
33 Stair, Inst 1.7.11.
34 Commentary to rule 3(3).
35 A view shared by Blackie & Farlam (n 14) at 496.
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